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1. Introduction 
As the European Union moves towards further enlargement and finds itself confronted 
with ever more complex problems, a number of principles have been adopted to assist 
its adaptation to this context: subsidiarity, proportionality, transparency and flexibility. 
These principles reflect a concern to leave as much scope for national decision as 
possible, to respect national arrangements and legal systems, to act only insofar as is 
necessary to achieve Treaty objectives, to consult widely, to take decisions as openly 
as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen, to recognise the possibility of 
differing arrangements between groups of Member States. Taken together, they aim to 
improve both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of European policy. 
For the Commission, the meaningful implementation of these principles is vital to the 
success of the policies with which we are entrusted and hence of the European project 
as a whole. This depends, however, upon a clear understanding of what is at stake in 
the process of regulation which these principles are ultimately aimed at - the role of the 
public actor, the limitations of traditional modes of action and the opportunities offered 
by alternative modes of governance. Such an understanding is necessary as we 
consider the reorganisation required to meet future challenges and how we may best 
deploy our available resources. 
Just as the role and methods of the Commission are evolving, so the regulatory 
situation at the national level has by no means been static. Rather, a rich picture of 
innovation is evident. The Workshop on the future of European regulatory action 
which took place on 11 June 1997 was organised within the framework of the seminar 
on transformations of governance which the Forward Studies Unit has devoted to the 
study of these innovations. Professors Giandomenico Majone and Renaud Dehousse 
from the European University Institute in Florence presented a diagnosis of the 
problems posed by the development of regulatory policies at the European level and 
offered some proposals for a long-term response. Their interventions throughout the 
Workshop and the discussions with personnel from the ·different services of the 
Commission who were present (see the annexed list) was organised in a spirit of 
assisting the self-understanding of the Commission in this developing context. While it 
is often tempting to believe that we are already doing our best and are well-adapted to 
the contemporary context, understandable self-assurance must never become 
complacency. There may sometimes be a reluctance to listen to outsiders who lack 
intimate knowledge of our daily practice, but their distance and consequent breadth of 
view can provide a useful balance. 
At the Workshop, the development of agencies in the European context was considered 
together with their future potential for improving the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
European policy. As was stressed by both Professors Majone and Dehousse, agencies 
were by no means presented as the unique possible response to contemporary problems 
but rather as an interesting and instructive example of what is taking place both at the 
European and national levels. Agencies as they currently exist are certainly not perfect 
and they raise as many questions as they answer. But these are questions which go to 
the heart of the regulatory process and thus of the European project. An examination of 
agencies with their network organisation and their need to integrate a variety of actors 
at different levels thus helps to identify the key issues at stake which we need to take 
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into account as we ponder reorganisation. Equally, such an examination allows a 
consideration of what the principles guiding European policy, such as those of 
subsidiarity and transparency, can mean in practice. 
The discussion provoked by the interventions of Professors Majone and Dehousse 
allowed the identification of methods and practices in the Commission which already 
go beyond the traditional conception of our role and which aim to enhance the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of our policies. This has provided us with a great deal of 
material for future meetings of the seminar at which the aim will be initially to deepen 
our shared understanding of the evolution of our role and methods and of the context of 
this evolution, and ultimately to enhance our ability to anticipate the further 
transformations that will be required in future. 
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2. Diagnosis: The Regulatory Deficit ·in the European 
Community 
2.1. Departure points 
7 
The principal point of departure for the Workshop was that there is evident within the 
EC a regulatory deficit, that is, a growth of responsibilities accompanied by only a sub-
optimal ability to deal with those responsibilities. The Commission has had the task of 
completing the internal market and its principal tool in this regard has been 
harmonisation. In order to achieve harmonisation, directives have been produced which 
set out the requirements which Member States must transpose into their own legal 
orders. The Commission has tended there~fter to concentrate on the question of whether 
directives have been formally transposed as opposed to the question of whether they are 
being substantively implemented or substantively observed. While this is a reflection at 
one level of the sometimes sluggish response of the Member States in even transposing 
directives, it is more importantly a reflection of our lack of expertise and resources to 
operate at any more detailed level. Despite this inability, the logic of achieving an 
internal market has led us to become involved in ever more areas where initially we had 
no competence. The need to remove barriers to the free movement of goods, services, 
capital and people means that divergences between Member States in the treatment of a 
whole range of social issues cannot be countenanced where they result in distortions of 
the market. Increasingly, therefore, there are issues of occupational health and safety, 
environmental protection and consumer safety to be dealt with and it is a question 
whether the harmonisation technique with its emphasis on detailed provisions and 
uniformity is appropriate in these circumstances. 
2-.2. From the logic of the market to the logic of protection 
On the one hand the logic of the market places a primary emphasis on the achievement 
of uniformity per se rather than on the precise level at which uniformity is achieved. 
On the other hand, the same logic assumes that the causal models upon which detailed 
provisions are based are uncontroversial and relatively stable. With issues of 
environmental, occupational and consumer safety, however, questions of the 
appropriate level of safety become predominant and the inherent instability of causal 
models becomes increasingly evident. In other words, it is increasingly the case that 
experts are explicitly uncertain about the appropriate causal models on which to base 
regulatory action or the variety of expert opinions available reveals the uncertainty. In 
such circumstances, where the status of expert opinion must be reappraised, regulation 
has to consider how expertise and social judgement can be integrated and it is 
increasingly clear that the pre-existing models of legislature, executive and judiciary 
are strained by this requirement. As means are sought to come to terms with complex, 
interdependent problems about which both uncertainty and a plurality of perspectives 
exists, a blurring of the classical separation of powers sometimes emerges as one 
institution carries out the functions previously associated with the others. It is no 
longer sufficient to see politics taking once and for all decisions on the basis of expert 
advice. Some occupational health and safety arrangements in which work-force and 
management are integrated into the process of identifying, assessing and managing 
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risks together with experts and regulators on an ongoing basis are examples of new 
approaches to regulation which attempt to accommodate the dynamic and 
interdependent nature of problems. The fact that the practical solutions that emerge 
from such arrangements often manifest enhanced legitimacy and effectiveness 
indicates the potential that a fresh approach to regulation can possess. It is a question, 
then, of examining the new approaches to regulation that we in the Commission have 
experience with and of drawing the lessons from them that can be shared more widely. 
2.3. Mutual recognition and delegation to standardisation bodies 
One response to this critique can be that the new approach to the completion of the 
market has adequately taken account of this shift. Mutual recognition and the 
delegation of standardisation decisions to private standards authorities on the basis of 
broadly-drawn instructions can be said to indicate an awareness of the difficulty of 
imposing detail from the European level. That said, however, it can be seen that this 
approach places its faith in the ability of Member States themselves to determine 
appropriate levels of protection and equally assumes the existence of stable models 
sufficient to ground the decisions of private standard authorities. In each case, the 
appropriateness of the mechanisms employed for the integration of expert and social 
knowledge and for the ongoing assessment of the assumptions underlying 
standardisation decisions is not addressed. 
This approach to the completion of the single market results in a diversity of rules 
among the Member States and raises the question of mutual trust and confidence. Are 
rules in each Member State being enforced equitably or is, for example, the regulation 
of risks to consumers or workers being used to provide a competitive advantage? If we 
accept that a return to trying to impose a unified approach from the European level is 
not possible, such a question indicates a need for measures which allow trust and 
confidence to be built up among those who are responsible for enforcement in the 
different Member States. Among existing measures cited by participants at the 
Workshop are those aimed at improving transparency between enforcement agencies 
such as the organisation of exchanges, common evaluations and joint inspections. Not 
only, therefore, must regulatory approaches address the problem of integrating expert 
and social judgment but they must also do so in a way which takes account of the 
question of mutual trust and confidence among Member States. 
2.4. Comitology, impact assessments and risk assessment 
But if harmonisation struggles to accommodate these new problems, what can take its 
place? To be sure, the Commission is. by no means unaware of these issues and it is 
clear that there is considerable evidence of a move away from a pure logic of market 
completion to a logic of protection with increasing emphasis on the identification, 
analysis and assessment of risks. At one level, the comitology approach possesses 
elements of the flexibility required both as regards the integration of expert and social 
know ledge and the need to transcend the classical separation of powers. At another, 
there are examples of regulatory approaches which represent significant advances over 
the traditional model: in the field of environmental protection, for example, one can 
mention the use of impact assessments and in the field of occupational health and 
safety one can point to the requirement for risk assessment in the Framework 
Directive. 
J 
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2.5. Limitations 
Despite these advances, however, reservations remain. Regarding comitology, a 
number of criticisms can be levelled: there are doubts about its ability to cope with an 
ever increasing workload; the rules are complex and ambiguous and by no means easy 
to discover; there is a general lack of transparency about the whole process; and there 
is no clear means of ensuring coherence among different sectoral policies. While the 
response of several participants was to minimise the importance of these criticisms, we 
should perhaps ask ourselves whether, if academic researchers from the Institute with 
the closest ties to the Commission are unable easily to discern the rules and processes 
of comitology, the experience of ordinary citizens is likely to be more positive. Albeit 
that efforts are made to identify stakeholders and to ensure that decisions are not 
imposed as some participants demonstrated, a number of questions arise. To what 
extent is the full range of perspectives on any given problem integrated by the 
comitology system? How representative are so-called representative organisations who 
may frequently be consulted? If poorly- or under-represented interests are excluded, 
what are the implications for the effectiveness and legitimacy of the decisions reached? 
Does the claimed flexibility of comitology become in practice rather rigid resulting in a 
fragmentation of policy and hence poor co-ordination? And finally, if everything in 
comitology is as good as has been claimed, can there be any objection to greater 
openness and a more systematic approach to its organisation? 
Beyond comitology, however, doubts can also be expressed about other attempts to 
come to terms with the challenges raised by the issue of risk. For all that the 
Commission's approach_ to environmental regulation is very forward-thinking, a fact 
endorsed at the Workshop by representatives from a range of DGs, the question arises 
as to how adequate this approach can be while other sectoral policies continue to be 
conducted according to less advanced means and methods. If Environmental Impact 
Analyses are widely recognised as a good idea, why do other sectoral policies not 
similarly require impact assessments? What does this reveal about the adequacy of our 
approach to the co-ordination of policy? The very fact that risk is the prime question 
demands that an integrated and co-ordinated approach is adopted otherwise there can 
by no means be said to be an appropriate or adequate identification and assessment of 
risk. Equally, in the example of health and safety regulation, the Framework Directive's 
general requirement for risk assessment appears to be compromised by the daughter 
directives' detailed regulatory requirements which impose solutions which may be at 
odds with the assessment of risks in context. It would appear, therefore, _that the future 
meetings of the seminar should examine some of our methods and practices in this 
light, notably mainstreaming and the use of risk assessment by the Commission. 
In short, for all that there are examples of the Commission's response to the shift from 
the logic of the completion of the market to the logic of protection, it is not clear that 
these form part of an integrated approach nor that they are based on a well worked out 
conceptualisation of the nature of the problem. If new methods and arrangements are 
based on the same presuppositions that underpinned foregoing approaches any gains 
will at best be temporary and at worst illusory 
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3. The Regulatory Process: The Nature of the 
Regulatory Process and The Logic of Delegation 
3.1. From direct government to indirect governance 
11 
Confronted by this type of problem, where the emphasis comes to be placed upon risk, 
there is evidence in a number of Member States of a shift away from direct or external 
government to indirect or internal governance: that is, the regulation of decentralised 
units responsible for the delivery of services or 'government by proxy'. While at the 
Workshop there were expressions of regret that the Commission could not exercise 
more power centrally and directly, there must be a recognition that such a desire is at 
odds both with the .complexity of the problems confronted and with the increasing 
demand of the wider public not simply to be governed but to be more directly involved 
in the process of regulation at every stage. Insofar as regulation does not take account 
of the individual contexts in which it is applied, it is doomed to failure. The centralised 
exercise of detailed regulation is simply inappropriate to this task. 
Consequently, as public actors come to recognise that the problems they confront are 
increasingly complex and that their ability to achieve stated objectives by coercive 
means has diminished, so these problems are delegated to units possessing expertise 
and independent judgement. While according to traditional models such a move can be 
seen to offend the notion that power should only be exercised by elected bodies, there 
are indeed good reasons why such majoritarian bodies are ill-suited to cope in such 
circumstances. In dealing with the most complex issues, the body entrusted with the 
task must possess credibility if it is to enjoy the support of the stakeholders in defining 
and analysing problems and in implementing solutions. In such cases, a vital 
component of this credibility will be the ability to demonstrate a long-term 
commitment to the tasks in hand. This is precisely what elected bodies cannot do 
because of their need to seek periodic re-election with the result that actions which 
produce short-term tangible gains are likely to be prioritised over those where the gains 
will only arise beyond the period of the next election. In such circumstances, 
credibility depends precisely on a non-elected, non-majoritarian status. 
3.2. New roles for public actors 
If public actors such as the Commission therefore feel a sense of loss in the transfer of 
power, however limited, to the new European agencies, this understanding of the 
situation provided by Majone and Dehousse should allow us to recognise the 
opportunities such a delegation allows for a more effective, legitimate and coherent 
approach to governance. Such a delegation may result in the loss of some tasks but 
increases the importance of others. Delegation of power to such bodies results in less 
detailed and technical work for the centralised public actor but implies an increase in 
internal regulatory tasks: the setting of priorities, the elaboration of mandates and 
guidelines for decentralised units, the monitoring and evaluation of the operation of 
these units and the ongoing overall co-ordination of policy. 
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3.3. Limitations 
This does not mean, however, that agencies are a panacea for contemporary problems. 
If agencies are able to overcome the temporal limits restricting the action of the elected 
public actor, the question remains as to their ability to overcome the cognitive limits. 
Indeed, the strict limitation of their role which delegation implies can result in a narrow 
focus which is ill-adapted to a recognition of horizontal problems. Thus, the precise 
organisation of the agency and the broader context in which it operates are of prime 
importance and the role of the centralised public actor is highlighted in terms of the 
overall co-ordination of policies. It may also be the case that some policies are 
unsuitable for delegation because of their global reach - as was convincingly argued for 
competition policy by one of the participants. While many policies need to be 
understood in a broader context, the risks arising from the narrower view of 
competition that an agency would probably possess appear greater than the potential 
benefits of delegation. That said, however, the question remains of the adequacy of the 
Commission's integration of other policies with competition decisions. 
The Future of European Regulation 
4. The Transnational Dimension: Regulation by 
Networks 
4.1. Networks as guarantors of credibility 
13 
Although the problems facing centralised public actors lead to delegation, the potential 
for decentralised expert institutions to be isolated and subject to ongoing interference 
means that the expected credibility gains may not be realised. As a consequence, such 
institutions need to establish networks of similar bodies to provide mutual support. The 
need to maintain credibility and reputation within such a network where there is a 
long-term commitment to a given policy area means that both political interference and 
capture by powerful interests can be more easily resisted. 
The new European agencies have established such networks of private and public 
actors with the aim of establishing a 'community of views'. As a consequence, these 
agencies are not so much new concentrations of power as the organisers or the 
animators of transnational regulatory networks. Similarly, their powers are limited and 
their primary role is the collection of data and the provision of information. While true 
objectivity is an unattainable goal, the need for the agencies to maintain independence 
and credibility within their networks means that their information has the potential to 
be particularly reliable and of value not only to policy makers at the European and 
national levels but also to the wider public. 
4.2. Limits and opportunities of networks 
But while networks can help to maintain the independence and credibility of agencies, 
there remains the danger that these networks of expert institutions may reflect an 
unduly narrow vision of the problems they have been entrusted to deal with. As a 
consequence, mechanisms are required which ensure the identification and integration 
of stakeholders into the· networks. Nor should such a move be restricted to the better-
organised and easily identifiable stakeholders but should also include the provision of 
assistance to the less well-organised. While several DGs are already involved in such 
initiatives, a more systematic and explicit approach would only serve to enhance the 
legitimacy and ultimately the effectiveness of European policy. The IMPEL network 
~as particularly mentioned by participants as an example of the advanced nature of our 
current practice and other examples in different sectors were also mentioned. 
And beyond ensuring that other perspectives are integrated into the operations of 
agencies, these expert institutions must be proactive in identifying potential conflicts 
with other policy programmes and in ensuring ongoing review of the assumptions and 
models upon which the information they provide is based. In other words, networks of 
such institutions must not operate so as to limit their vision of the policy area but must 
be an opportunity to assist in the overall co-ordination of policies. Similarly, the 
involvement of other stakeholders must not simply be an exercise in easing the 
dissemination of information or in formal legitimation, but rather a genuine integration 
of other perspectives in order to enhance the quality of information and action. Key 
features of such a use of networks are the adoption of methodologies which enable 
horizontal communication with other policy areas and of participative qualitative 
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methods to supplement more technical quantitative methods as a means of improving 
the quality of data and of assisting communication with other stakeholders. 
The examples presented by participants at the Workshop of networks with which 
different DGs are already involved can allow us in future meetings to consider our 
awareness of and response to the issues discussed above: the role of the animator of 
networks, the identification and integration of stakeholders, and the co-ordinati9n of 
policies. 
"' ! 
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5. Improving Regulatory Co-ordination 
While individual policies can appear coherent and to have a high probability of success 
within the terms of their own particular area, they can ultimately fail or produce 
unintended side-effects ·in other areas. This is due at one level to the inadequacy of 
political oversight both of individual programmes and of the totality of programmes. 
One way of dealing with this problem is to require impact assessments not just for 
some areas of policy (such as the environment or SMEs) but for all policies. 
Experience with these assessments can assist in the overall setting of priorities and in 
better adapting the approach of individual policies. 
The approach in the US is instructive in this regard where the Office of Management 
and Budget organises a regulatory budget. This requires the different agencies to 
submit regulatory proposals in terms of their costs and benefits and allows rational 
oversight of the entire programme. Horizontal transparency is improved as is the 
transparency of the regulatory process to other stakeholders. Despite the particular 
difficulties at the European level (for example the difficulty of evaluating the impact of 
measures which will be determined according to national modalities that are uncertain 
at the outset) CBA is already practised in certain circumstances by the Commission as 
it is increasingly required in such areas as the environment and in occupational health 
and safety. But again, positive claims for current practice in these domains must be set 
against the absence of such an approach elsewhere especially in view of its clear utility 
in giving meaning to the principle of proportionality. Once again, our current practice 
of CBA and of more qualitative methods can provide a focus for future meetings of the 
seminar. 
5.1. Limitations 
Hewever, it is a question of the extent to which the perspectives of other stakeholders 
are integrated into the regulatory process. Co-ordinating programmes is a step forward 
but there must be awareness of the limits of co-ordination restricted to monetised 
values and of the ability of a regulatory budget to engage and integrate other 
stakeholders. Such an awareness implies not only the establishment of a central body 
such as the OMB but also of ongoing mechanisms at the level of agencies, their 
networks and lower level actors· which encourage a broader vision than individual 
programmes and the expert models associated with those programmes. 
The OMB model is, then, not a panacea, but it is instructive insofar as it represents an 
attempt to deal rationally and systematically with the co-ordination of policies. In the 
absence of such an attempt, the possibility of duplicated effort, of counterproductive 
interactions and even of dangerous side-effects increases. Similarly, the chance to take 
advantage of regulatory synergies and to foresee expensive problems is lost. 
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5.2. Opportunities 
Considering new approaches to co-ordination is especially important as we embark on 
the reorganisation aimed at dealing with the challenges of enlargement. Claims at the 
Workshop that the Commission already carries out a role analogous to the OMB were 
tempered by a recognition that it nevertheless could benefit from clarification. As the 
logic of this approach to governance becomes more compelling in the context of 
enlargement, the need to understand the co-ordinating role of the Commission in a 
systematic and rational way becomes urgent. Are our methods aimed at the integration 
of the perspectives of other services really sufficient? What improved means could be 
deployed in order that other points of view are actively sought and considered at a 
sufficiently early stage? 
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6. Improving Legitimacy and Procedural Rationality 
While agencies represent a potential gain over comitology in terms of legitimacy 
because of their greater visibility and their ability to feed the policy debate in both 
directions, the danger remains that they can fail to fulfil that potential as a result of 
precisely the same problems which have beset comitology: a diversity of rules, an 
expansion of committees, an overlap of activities and ultimately a reduction in 
transparency both horizontal and vertical. There was indeed acceptance at the 
Workshop that the current European agency model precisely risks these problems 
insofar as it is essentially pre-Maastricht, technocratic and thus ill-suited to the current 
context in terms of its inability to integrate other perspectives. One way of dealing with 
these problems would be to adopt a unified set of rules equivalent to the 
Administrative Procedures Act of the US. This would rationalise decision making and 
both guarantee and regulate the involvement of other stakeholders. And, together with 
developments of European law associated with access to justice and locus standi, the 
consequent availability of judicial review would enhance the legitimacy of European 
regulatory action - the very possibility of its use would have a beneficial effect on the 
development and implementation of policy. Although the problems of delays and costs 
associated with judicial· review in the US can lead to skepticism about its benefits, it 
was pointed out that the culture of litigation evident in that jurisdiction is not such a 
feature of the European context. 
While the Workshop considered the possibility of extending the agency model and of 
introducing a European Administrative Procedures Act to address the legitimacy and 
effectiveness problems confronting the EU, this was done less as a firm proposal for 
what ought to be done and more with a view to highlighting the sorts of issues that the 
Commission needs to address as it considers reform in the contemporary context. 
In other words, it is not a question of which institutional arrangement is better per se 
but rather of how well any institutional arrangement is able to deal with the nature of 
contemporary problems. If these problems are understood as complex and 
interdependent as opposed to being susceptible to the tools provided by one expert 
discipline; as possessing the potential to reveal further aspects of uncertainty in the 
future as opposed to being clearly definable once and for all in advance; as being open 
to differing definitions according to different perspectives, etc. then any institutional 
arrangement needs to address a number of key issues: 
the need to identi.fy and to integrate multiple perspectives in all stages of the 
regulatory process from the setting of problems and priorities, through the 
implementation of solutions to the evaluation and revision of policy; 
the importance of horizontal policy co-ordination and the need to avoid narrow 
economic and expert co-ordination mechanisms; 
the importance of reflexivity or the ongoing questioning of assumptions, 
assessments of risks, etc.; 
the need to achieve a contextualised approach to the regulatory process; 
the utility of a vision of the regulatory process as a process of collective learning. 
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It is a question then of considering whether our methods and organisation sufficiently 
address these issues and whether we are engaged in a sufficiently systematic appraisal 
of our reorganisation. The examples cited by participants at the Workshop of how we 
have already adapted ourselves to the developing context in ways which go beyond the 
traditional conception of our role will allow us in future meetings to deepen a shared 
understanding of the nature of the problems we face and of the appropriate responses. 
There are risks in adopting any more ad hoe approach to reform. In this regard, the 
BSE case was cited at the Workshop as a:n example of our ability to reform ourselves 
in response to emergent problems. In terms of a traditional understanding of the 
process of regulation this is perhaps true. But in the context of the understanding 
developed by this project, such a response can be said to indicate the dangers of 
complacency and an inability to draw the wider lessons. The Commission has 
undoubtedly reformed itself as a result of this case with regard to food safety. But it did 
so only reactively in the context of unprecedented public concern and of the threat of 
firm action from the Parliament and only in the field of food safety. Has it taken any 
steps to consider proactively the potential problems which may lie latent behind other 
administrative arrangements which are ill-adapted to the co-ordination of policy and 
the interdependence of problems? 
Another speaker appeared nearer the mark when he endorsed the need to .consider a 
procedural approach. He stressed that the central question in European policy was one 
of confidence and that there was a need to consider new forms of representation which 
could achieve a better integration of economic and social policy. While the 
presuppositions of traditional regulatory approaches remain unchallenged such an 
integration will be extremely difficult to achieve and the guiding principles of 
subsidiarity, proportionality, transparency and flexibility could fail to fulfil their 
potential in the absence of a coherent and systematic understanding of the nature of the 
regulatory process in contemporary and foreseeable conditions. 
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APPENDIX 1 
7. Programme of the Workshop 
FORWARD STUDIES UNIT 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT 
Workshop: Improving the Regulatory Process in the European Community 
Brussels, 11 June 1997 
9h30 - 9h40 
9h40 - lOhlO 
lOh 10 - 10h30 
10h30 - 1 lh15 
1 lh15 - l lh30 
llh30 - 1 lh50 
llh50 - 12hl0 
12hl0 - 13h00 
13h00 - 14h30 
14h30 - 14h50 
14h50 15h00 
15h00 - 15h20 
15h20 - 16h00 
16h00 - 16h15 
16h15 - 16h25 
16h25 - 17h20 
l 7h20 - l 7h30 
Introductory Comments : The Governance Project 
Jerome VIGNON 
DIAGNOSIS 
The Regulatory Deficit in the EC 
Renaud DEHOUSSE 
Short Discussion introduced by 
John FARNELL 
THE REGULA TORY PROCESS 
The Nature of the Regulatory Process 
and the Logic of Delegation 
Giandomenico MAJONE 
Coffee break 
Short Discussion introduced by 
Niels AHRENDT, Evangelos v ARDAKAS 
THE TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSION 
Regulation by Networks 
Renaud DEHOUSSE 
Round Table and Open Discussion 
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APPENDIX2 
8. Key points of the governance project approach vis-
a-vis the presentation by professors Majone and 
Dehousse 
8.1. The Regulatory Deficit in the European Community 
A. The Shortcomings of the Harmonization Model 
MAJONE AND DEHOUSSE 
Majone and Dehousse describe a situation in which a growth of responsibilities for the 
EU is accompanied by its ability to deal with those responsibilities only in a sub-
optimal way - a regulatory deficit. 
This is due to a combination of factors including the fact that in attempting to achieve 
harmonised standards for the internal market, the Commission tends to focus on 
whether or not directives have been formally transposed as opposed to whether they 
have been substantively implemented or are being substantively observed. It is in any 
event a question whether the Commission possesses the resources, the expertise or 
indeed the authority to assess such substantive issues. 
A further problem at the European level is the need for there to be trust and confidence 
among Member States that each is implementing agreed policies. The lack of a 
centralised auth~rity with inspection and enforcement powers makes this difficult to 
achieve. 
In addition, it may not always be possible to anticipate in a legislative instrument the 
elements that will emerge in the implementation phase. Thus, even where directives 
are transposed and implemented, there is no guarantee that they will produce the 
desired effect. 
The completion of the single market has resulted in the extension of EU competences 
into areas where initially there was none but where intervention is required to prevent 
distortions of the market. This has been accepted by the Member States only with great 
reticence and on the basis that they maintain control of negotiation and have the 
exclusive right to implement decisions. Majone and Dehousse stress in addition the 
fact that the completion of the single market implies the ability to detect and control 
risk. This implies new competencies for the Commission and the uncertainty involved 
requires greater flexibility, the integration of expert and social judgement throughout 
the regulatory process instead of just at the beginning and a shift to the legal provision 
of procedures rather than of fixed solutions. 
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GOVERNANCE PROJECT - DIAGNOSIS 
The governance project would agree with this diagnosis and would emphasise 
especially the impossibility in any event of a body such as the Commission taking on 
centralised responsibility for the detailed provision of rules and their detailed 
implementation. 
The complex and interdependent nature of many contemporary problems has rendered 
this model of regulation and this role for the public actor redundant in many instances 
as has been demonstrated by the project so far. 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT- PROPOSALS 
An explicitly enabling role for a public actor such as the Commission is envisaged as 
opposed to an interventionist role. 
The aim is more actively to seek to anticipate the elements that may emerge in the 
implementation phase (for example, unintended side-effects, the realisation of risks) by 
integrating more perspectives, both internal and external to public actors at 
Commission and national level. 
This involves at the highest level an emphasis on the co-ordination of policies. 
B. Comitology 
MAJONE AND DEHOUSSE 
Comitology allows the Community to have an influence beyond the level of rule-
making. Such an approach allows economic and cultural differences to be considered 
in the elaboration phase as different perspectives (political, interest group and expert) 
are brought to bear on policy questions. It is thus useful for developing working 
routines and commonly shared assumptions. But there are limits to the workload it can 
handle, a lack of uniformity of rules and a lack of transparency. 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT- DIAGNOSIS 
Emphasises especially the question of accessibility and transparency as regards 
comitology. Which perspectives are included in the elaboration of policy? There is a 
danger that poorly-organised or unrepresented interests are simply ignored or at best 
under-represented with the implications this has for the legitimacy and the 
effectiveness of the decisions ultimately taken. 
Equally, there is a question about the ability of comitology to adapt to the horizontal 
.and evolving nature of problems which are often difficult if not impossible to perceive 
in advance. Can this be achieved in a systematic and sufficient way within the 
comitology structure? There is a danger that the consideration of policy becomes 
fragmented and rigid. 
There is a shift from a situation where rules are formulated in advance and then applied 
to a situation where the process of regulation is understood as ongoing. 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT- PROPOSALS 
Mechanisms are required which are more flexible and which can enhance the input of 
different perspectives throughout the regulatory process with improved possibilities for 
multidisciplinary approaches and stakeholder involvement, leading to greater 
transparency and improved effectiveness. Experience with more decentralised 
negotiated rulemaking could be instructive in this regard. 
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The development of working routines and commonly shared assumptions must be 
accompanied by reflexivity - i.e. ongoing evaluation, risk assessment, questioning of 
assumptions - again with a multidisciplinary approach incorporating stakeholders. 
C. Alternative Responses to the Regulatory Deficit 
MAJONE AND DEHOUSSE 
Two broad alternatives are put forward and rejected. 
Legislative - i.e. specify in greater detail the obligations for national administrations. 
This is rejected on the basis of resentment at further intrusion. 
Supranational - i.e. enhancing the Commission's implementation and control powers. 
This is rejected on the grounds of lack of resources, expertise, etc. 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT- DIAGNOSIS 
The governance project stresses the cognitive limits standing in the way of detailed 
regulation handed down from any centralised authority whether the response to the 
regulatory deficit is legislative or supranational. 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT - PROPOSALS 
A radical rethinking of the way in which norms are elaborated and applied is therefore 
required. It is no longer possible to view regulation as the elaboration of norms by 
legislators followed by their application by administrators or judges. Issues such as 
uncertainty and complexity render this linear model of regulation inadequate. 
Majone and Dehousse recognise this when they state that 'The most urgent task is the 
development of sophisticated legal techniques which oversee the ongoing process of 
risk-evaluation and standard-setting.' 
This opens the way for discussion of the nature of the regulatory process in these 
conditions. 
8.2. The Nature of the Regulatory Process and the Logic of 
Delegation 
MAJONE AND DEHOUSSE 
Majone and Dehousse emphasise the shift from direct governance to the regulation of 
decentralised units responsible for the delivery of services. 
This is due to a recogition of the increasingly complex problems confronted which call 
for expertise and independent judgement. 
It is equally due to the increasingly limited ability of public actors to achieve policy objectives 
by coercive means. · 
For both reasons, an approach which possesses credibility is required. However, political 
institutions because of their limited time horizons lack credibility in cases where a long-term 
commitment to policy is required. 
The answer is delegation to non-majoritarian expert institutions. 
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A list of institutional choices for principals (i.e. those delegating) is provided, the main 
consideration being whether agency costs exceed the benefits. 
Agencies are envisaged which are characterised by their limited scope, the fact that they are 
evaluated on their performance, etc. 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT - DIAGNOSIS 
The governance project would agree with this assessment and acknowledges the 
important addition to the logic of delegation which the idea of temporal horizons 
offers. 
However, it would insist on the importance of the cognitive limits not only on the 
public actors who must now delegate authority but also on those institutions to which 
authority is delegated. 
As a consequence, while limiting the scope of agency authority is an understandably 
cautious approach, it may unduly restrict their ability to identify and respond to 
horizontal problems. Similarly, evaluating an agency on its performance with regard to 
a limited function may be an exercise of little practical value if horizontal problems 
and side-effects have emerged. 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT- PROPOSALS 
Mechanisms are required which ensure that the limitations on expert and bureaucratic 
models at the level of centralised authorities do not reappear at the level of 
decentralised institutions. 
Thus, the integration of social with expert perspectives; co-ordination with other 
policies; ongoing assessment of risks, evaluation of policy and revision of objectives 
and means are all important. 
The project thus proposes more contextualised regulatory processes producing 
differentiated rules which nevertheless respect overall coherence and co-ordination. 
This leads on to the role which networks can play in meeting the concerns raised by 
the governance project as well as the problems of trust and confidence which the lack 
of a strong central authority produces. 
8.3. Regulation by Networks 
MAJONE AND DEHOUSSE 
Although the problems facing majoritarian centralised authorities leads to delegation, 
the potential for decentralised expert institutions to be isolated and subject to ongoing 
political interference means that the expected credibility gains may not be realised. 
As a consequence, the establishment of networks of such institutions is required to 
produce mutual support. The need to maintain credibility and reputation within such a 
network where there is a long-term commitment to a given policy area means that 
political interference can be resisted as can capture by powerful interests. 
' 
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The new European agencies have established such networks of private and public 
actors leading to a 'community of views'. With narrowly defined powers, they exist at 
the heart of transnational regulatory networks rather than as concentrations of power. 
They are better than comitology at reducing decision-making costs and agency costs 
and they improve accountability and legitimacy. 
The new agency approach operates on the basis of the provision of information to 
Community and Member State policy makers. 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT - DIAGNOSIS 
The project stresses the need for networks as a means of ensuring that a variety of 
perspectives are brought to bear on complex problems. While networks can assist in 
dealing with the problems of trust and confidence that can arise among Member States, 
a network of expert institutions adhering to a closed vision of a policy area would not 
represent an advance over traditional models. 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT- PROPOSALS 
Mechanisms are required which ensure the identification and integration of involved 
public and private stakeholders into networks. This involves, for example, going 
beyond organised interests and assisting less organised stakeholders both ~o receive 
information and to present their perspectives. The Commission is already active in this 
direction but a more systematic approach would improve the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of European policy. 
Agencies must be proactive in identifying potential conflicts with other policy 
programmes and in ensuring ongoing review of the assumptions and models upon 
which the information they provide is based. Networks must therefore not operate so as 
to limit their vision with regard to their policy area but must be an opportunity to assist 
co-ordinated action. The use of methodologies which explicitly take account of other 
policies and other perspectives and the adoption of participative qualitative methods to 
supplement CBA are important factors in achieving transparency of agency action both 
with regard to other agencies (assisting horizontal co-ordination) and with regard to 
other stakeholders (improving legitimacy and effectiveness). 
This leads to the issue of improving co-ordination. 
8.4. Improving Regulatory Co-ordination 
MAJONE AND DEHOUSSE 
While individual policies can be aimed at correcting market failures, they can equally 
produce side-effects which constitute regulatory failure. This is due to inadequate 
political oversight of the totality of programmes and of individual programmes and to 
economic inefficiency. 
There is a need for impact evaluation of the totality of programmes, priority setting 
within and across programmes and at the lowest level a comparison of individual rules 
on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. 
The Future of European Regulation 26 
A regulatory budget on the US model is one solution although in itself this is 
inadequate.· Impact assessments are also required together with comment and review 
procedures. 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT- DIAGNOSIS 
The project agrees with this diagnosis but points out that it is not simply a question of 
co-ordinating diverse agency programmes but of recognising the need to co-ordinate a 
multitude of perspectives. 
The ability of a regulatory budget to accommodate issues which are not easily 
monetised is therefore crucial, as is the ability of impact assessments and related 
comment and review procedures to enagage all relevant stakeholders. 
Minimising the risk of unintended side-effects from ·interacting programmes depends 
on moving beyond the restricted vision of expert models. 
Governance project - Proposals 
A centralised co-ordinating mechanism which operates so as to enable the assessment 
of risks, costs and benefits as between programmes including social as well as expert 
judgement is required. 
Cost-benefit analysis must be sufficiently open as to allow assessments of social costs 
and benefits which may be masked by narrow economic indicators. 
The potential for savings and gains due to co-operative regulatory approaches, 
regulatory synergies, greater responsiveness to emergent problems, improvements in 
legitimacy and effectiveness must also be recognised and set against the undoubted 
costs involved in establishing co-ordinating mechanisms. 
Such a view of co-ordination implies not only the establishment of a central body like 
the OMB/OIRA but also of ongoing mechanisms at the level of agencies, their 
networks and lower level actors which encourage a broader vision than individual 
programmes. 
This takes us back to some of the points mentioned in earlier sections and leads to the 
next section where the key features of a procedural approach can be emphasised. 
8.5. Improving Legitimacy and Procedural Rationality 
MAJONE AND DEHOUSSE 
Majone and Dehousse identify the agency approach as leading to gains in legitimacy 
because of their greater visibility and their feeding of the policy debate. They note, 
however, that there are. dangers that they may go the same way as comitology in terms 
of diverse rules, an expansion of committees and eventually a reduced transparency. 
As a result they advocate the establishment of a European APA to rationalise decision 
making, regulate the involvement of interest groups and allow judicial review. 
• 
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GOVERNANCE PROJECT - DIAGNOSIS 
The project agrees with the usefulness of an APA in establishing clear procedures and 
guarantees for participative decision-making. 
It is a question, however, of the adequacy of an APA (in the minimal form which they 
envisage - namely consolidating current practice) to accommodate the issues 
highlighted in previous sections. 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT - PROPOSALS 
The project emphasises: 
the identification arid integration of multiple perspectives in all stages of the 
regulatory process from the setting of problems and priorities, through the 
implementation of solutions to the evaluation and revision of policy; 
- the importance of horizontal policy co-ordination and the need to avoid narrow 
economic and expert co-ordination mechanisms; 
- the importance of reflexivity - the ongoing questioning of assumptions, assessment 
of risks, etc.; 
- a contextualised approach to the regulatory process; 
a vision of the regulatory process as a process of collective learning. 
The principles of proportionality and subsidiarity can be given renewed meaning in the context 
of such an approach and the efficiency and legitimacy deficits confronting European policy 
can be addressed. 
8.6. General Questions 
What would the role of the Commission be vis-a-vis the agencies if their role was to 
develop further? 
What would be the impact of mechanisms aiming at the overall coherence of policy on 
the structure and methods of the Commission? 
What would the implications be for the judicial approach of the ECJ? 
What would the role of the Parliament and the consultative bodies (ECOSOC, 
Committee of the Regions) be? 
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